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Resolving the Auditor Liability Problem—An Appraisal of
Some Alternatives
Richard H . Murray
Touche Ross & C o .
Decades before others were discussing the problem of auditors' liability,
indeed years before many of us were born, M r . Justice Cardozo masterfully
defined the problem i n the Landmark case of Ultramares vs., Touche (then
Touche, N i v e n & C o . ) :
T h e defendants owed to their employer a duty imposed by law to
make their certificate without fraud, and a duty growing out of contract
to make it with the care and caution proper to their calling. . . . T o
creditors and investors to w h o m the employer exhibited the certificate,
the defendants owed a like duty to make it without fraud, since there
was notice i n the circumstances of its making that the employer d i d not
intend to keep it to himself. . . . A different question develops when
we ask whether they owed a duty to these to make it without negligence.
If liability for negligence exists, a thoughtless slip or blunder, the failure
to detect a theft or forgery beneath the cover of deceptive entries, may
expose accountants to a liability i n an indeterminate amount for an
indeterminate time to an indeterminate class. The hazards of a business
conducted on these terms are so extreme as to enkindle doubt whether
a flaw may not exist in the implication of a duty that exposes to these
consequences. (Emphasis added, 255 N . Y . 170, 174 N.E.441) (1931)
A s a result of these concerns, the Ultramares decision held that, while
auditors could be liable to their clients for simple negligence, they would have
to be guilty of a considerably higher degree of fault i n order to be liable i n
damages to third parties.
Post-Ultramares Developments
W h i l e the Supreme Courts of most States quickly followed the lead of
Ultramares i n cases involving claims against auditors, the first forty years after
that decision saw a number of developments that ran counter to the Cardozo
concern for avoiding destructive risks to the accounting profession:
• T h e Federal Securities L a w s enacted i n 1933 and 1934, contain specific
provisions permitting the purchasers of corporate securities to recover
damages from auditors for something akin to negligence. However,
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those provisions were limited to specific claims, such as purchasers at
an initial offering of securities (Section 11 of the 1933 A c t ) , or purchasers relying upon documents filed with the S E C (Section 18 of
the 1934 A c t ) . T h e Federal Laws were silent w i t h respect to liability
from market transactions generally, leaving the impression that the
standards of the Ultramares decision were acceptable to the Congress
and were intended to control all securities liabilities not specifically
defined by the '33 and '34 Acts.
• Beginning about twenty years ago, however, the Federal Courts began
to engraft upon the Securities Laws the concept of implied rights of
recovery for general trading activity i n corporate securities. T h i s
trend, focusing principally upon Rule 10(b) of the 1934 A c t , and the
Commission's related Rule 10(b)5, was a major piece of social legislation through judicial fiat. T h e extent of the philosophical change
brought by the development of 10(b)5 liabilities is manifest i n the
fact that these new rights of action emerged w i t h lower standards of
liability (negligence or less) than the established standards of Ultramares, and with none of the conditions or limitations upon liability
(statute of limitations, statutory defenses, etc.,) which Congress had
provided for the specific remedies i n Section 11 and Section 18.
• T h e past fifteen years have seen certain erosions of the Ultramares
principle i n proceedings under common law and state law traditions,
as well. Under the theory that more is always better i n the case of
plaintiff's rights of recovery, the American L a w Institute promulgated
changes i n its semi authoritative Restatement of Torts. T h e resulting
expansion of the liability of auditors (and, for that matter, of attorneys,
and for many other participants i n securities transactions) was characterized by one court i n 1968: " T h e wisdom of the decision i n Ultramares has been doubted . . . and this court shares the doubt. W h y
should an innocent reliant party be forced to carry the weighty burden
of an accountant's professional malpractice? Isn't the risk of loss more
easily distributed and fairly spread by imposing it on the Accounting
profession, which can pass the cost of insuring against the risk on to
its customers, who can i n turn pass the cost on to the entire consuming
public? Finally, wouldn't a rule of foreseeability elevate the cautionary
techniques of the Accounting profession?" (Rusch Factors, Inc., v.
L e v i n , 284 F . Supp. 85) (1968)
By the 1970's it was quite legitimate to question whether the Ultramares
decision and the Cardozo fear of undue exposure was passe. Perhaps the fear
expressed so many years before was overstated; at least, there had been no major
disastrous judgments entered against accountants. Moreover, there seemed to
be little sympathy or concern for the plight of an accounting profession which
had prospered during the ensuing years.
T h e Litigious E r a
T i m e and circumstances were, however, catching up with those who saw
public benefit behind every suit against an accounting firm. T h e explosion of
claims against accountants during the late 60's and early 70's was noted i n
many quarters (see, for example, Earle, "Accountants on T r i a l i n a Theatre of
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the A b s u r d " Fortune, M a y 1972, and Liggio, "Accountants' C i v i l Liability:
Through the L o o k i n g Glass and Other Impossible T h i n g s " A B A Litigation
Magazine, V o l u m e 1). A l t h o u g h the voices of concern came initially from
within the profession, the reality of the crisis caused by the number of claims,
size of the recoveries sought, and the frustrations and expense of defending class
action procedures were ultimately recognized by the U . S . Supreme Court. T h e
first warning was struck i n Blue Chip Stamps vs., Manor Drug Stores, (421
U . S . 723) (1975):
There has been widespread recognition that litigation under Rule
10(b)5 represents a danger of vexatiousness different i n degree and i n
k i n d from that which accompanies litigation i n general. . . . W e believe
that the concern expressed for the danger of vexatious litigation w h i c h
could result from a widely expanded class of plaintiffs under Rule
10(b)5 is founded i n something more substantial than the common
complaint of the many defendants who would prefer avoiding law suits
entirely to either settling them or trying them. These concerns have two
largely separate grounds. T h e first of these concerns is that i n the field
of Federal Securities Laws governing disclosure of information even a
complaint which by objective standards may have very little chance of
success at trial has a settlement value to the plaintiff out of proportion to
its prospect of success at trial so long as he may prevent the suit from
being resolved against h i m by dismissal or summary judgment.
Pursuing this theme, the A I C P A Amicus
months later urged the court to recognize:

Brief i n the Hochfelder

case a few

D u r i n g their pendence, the charges leveled against a firm of Certified
Public Accountants constitute a cloud on their professional reputation
and a threat to their professional standing. T h e in terrorem effect of
the pendency of even the more meritricious litigation provides a settlement value i n such law suits having no relationship to the quantitative
size or qualitative merit of the claim.
T h e capstone of this development was the Supreme Court's decision i n
Ernst & Ernst vs., Hochfelder, (425 U . S . 185) (1976). T h e Court noted the
absurd contrast between the obvious language and purposes of the Federal
Securities Acts and the uncontained potential for liability that had developed
under the judiciary's creation of the 10(b)5 phenomena. A s a result, the Court
held that civil damage claims under the implied liability sections of the Federal
Securities Acts could only be awarded upon proof that the accountant involved
had been guilty of scienter, a k n o w i n g intent to violate the law.
Most recently the N e w Y o r k Court of Appeals reaffirmed the principles of
its earlier Ultramares decision, with only slight extensions of auditor liability,
in the case of White vs., Guarente decided just last December.
Cardozo's Fears Realized
Thus, the theoretical concern expressed by Cardozo has come full circle.
Ironically, graphic proof of the accuracy of Cardozo's fears did not mature until
1977 when a California State Court jury rendered its decision i n the U . S .
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Financial Litigation. That verdict against Touche Ross of more than 27 million
dollars results from a pattern of facts which clearly manifests the worst of the
Cardozo fears:
• T h e plaintiffs consisted of twenty four banks and insurance companies
i n the U . S . and abroad who purchased notes privately placed by U . S .
Financial without any registration proceedings or other advance indications that would give any warning that they would be relying upon
financial statements at the time those statements were rendered.
• T h e majority of plaintiff institutions made their investment decision
on the basis of intermediary recommendations without obtaining or
examining the financial statements which contained numerous footnotes disclosures creating doubt about the quality of the earnings
reported.
• T h e plaintiffs' losses on these notes resulted from a decline i n the
general health and market value of real estate development firms
like U . S . Financial, and i n part from a pervasive scheme of fraud
perpetrated by company management i n collusion w i t h numerous
third parties including officers of the company's principal commercial bank.
• Touche Ross was charged only with negligence i n the conduct of
its audits for 1970 and 1971; the plaintiffs specifically disclaimed any
suggestion that Touche was guilty of either intentional or reckless
conduct.
• T h e jury, which cumulatively possessed no educational degrees beyond high school, was required to reach a verdict after nine months
of trial which produced over 18 thousand pages of transcript and
hundreds of exhibits arising from the numerous and complex issues.
• T h e jury concluded, within the first hour of deliberations, that Touche
Ross had been negligent and that the plaintiffs were therefore entitled
to full reimbursement of all their losses plus pre-judgment interest.*
It is clear that the past two years have seen both a judicial endorsement of
the concerns originally expressed by Cardozo, and a manifestation of those fears
in action.
A Broader Problem?
T h e recognition that the risk of civil damage recoveries constitutes a major
problem for the accounting profession is, however, only a start towards defining
the problem. T h e more significant issue is the need to determine whether this
phenomenon also constitutes a problem for broader national interests. A recent
report by the Sub-Committee on Reports, Accounting and Management, of the
Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs ( T h e Metcalf Committee) opined
that " . . . potential legal liability for negligence is the most effective mechanism
for assuring that independent auditors performed their public responsibility
*The verdict has been appealed on a number of grounds, including our belief that the
Ultramares standards should prevail in California to prevent such an investor recovery for
simple negligence. We also believe that negligence by Touche Ross was not established at the
trial. The case will be appealed on that ground as well.
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competently and diligently." W h i l e that is clearly the conclusion which the
Committee's staff had hoped the Committee would reach, I don't believe that
any of the testimony or written submissions submitted to the Committee i n the
course of its investigation gave any credence to that conclusion. Rather, the
events of recent years have given credence to the position articulated by former
S E C Commissioner A l Summer:
T h e S E C is not unconcerned with the danger of excessive financial
loss, for we recognize that an indigent profession, or one blighted w i t h
financial adversity, w i l l need to reduce its exposure and thereby lessen
protection afforded investors.
A T w o - F o l d Issue
T h e issue thus presented is essentially two fold: H a s the risk of liability
stimulated improved performance by the accounting profession, and A r e the
burdens of this risk more detrimental to the public interest than any such
benefits? T h e Commission on Auditors' Responsibilities (the Cohen Commission) directly addressed the issue i n a staff study conducted by Professor Henry
Jaenicke of F r a n k l i n and Marshall College, later separately published as (Research Study N o . 1 of the A I C P A ) , T h e Effect of Litigation on Independent
Auditors.
In that study, Jaenicke notes that the Accounting profession has been
much more active i n the past decade i n developing accounting principles and
auditing standards, and i n recognizing new ways i n which it can serve the
public. H e concludes that the principal reason for this activism is the fear of
civil liability. Professor Jaenicke acknowledges that his conclusion is based
principally on the fact that both trends (professional activism and the litigation
explosion) occurred at about the same time. That the latter has influenced the
former seems unassailable; that fear is the primary motivation of professional
service, however, seems to strain the available facts and rejects any recognition
of the profession's own sense of responsibility and self-initiated goals. I suggest
that the accounting profession has demonstrated more rapid acclimation to contemporary challenges and public needs than has any other institutional component
of the social and commercial scene, including the American Bar, the business
community and perhaps Congress itself.
T h e dispute over what motivates professional improvements and how
successful accountants have been i n this regard is beyond the scope of this
paper. A more meaningful question for present attention is: assuming that fear
of liability has some salutary effect on the profession's concept of public responsibility, is more always better, or have we reached (or perhaps passed) the optimum
balance between the benefits and the detriments of that fear. I do not suggest
that the Accounting profession or any major firm within it w i l l be destroyed by
the burdens of litigation. Rather, I am concerned that fear of excessive liability
w i l l deter the profession from serving the public as broadly and as effectively
as it could.
T h i s concern has been expressed with increasing frequency i n recent years,
such as the observation of Russell E . Palmer that:
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T h e Accounting profession may . . . be showing some reluctance to
extend itself into new areas. In connection w i t h two recent controversies—Reporting on Interim Financial Statements and Reporting on
Forecasts—the profession chose to debate and discuss rather than actively experiment. True, there are some difficult technical issues i n each
of these areas, but I am concerned that we may be using the conceptual
questions to shield us from possible additional exposure to liability.
("It's T i m e to Stop T a l k i n g , " Journal of Accountancy, October, 1975)
T h e effect of such reluctance was noted by M a u t z and Sharaf in their 1961
monograph published by the American Accounting Association:
First, the auditor appears to be renouncing his right to an area i n
which he has competence and i n which he can be of service; Second,
as a professional group auditors are i n effect refusing to provide an effective service to the business community; T h i r d , auditors are emphasizing to clients and to the world at large their unwillingness to accept
responsibility, to provide a difficult but useful service, to attempt to cope
on even a small scale with an evil force that blights business life in no
unsubstantial degree. ( T h e Philosophy of A u d i t i n g )
Future Directions
I believe the available evidence demonstrates that the profession has reached
the optimum level of reaction to litigation pressures and now faces the prospect
of retrenchment from responsibility as a rational response to the escalation of
such risks. N o w that the profession has firmly internalized the sense of public
responsibility newly imposed upon it during the present generation, further i m provement i n the quality and diligence of performance w i l l depend on the profession's ability to recruit and retain the most competent people and our ability
to foster courage and responsibility i n their actions. T h e continuance and escalation of exposure to civil liabilities places both of these goals i n jeopardy, particularly as contrasted with the opportunities in the business world that are not so
infected w i t h risk.
It is a common phenomenon of 20th Century U . S . social and political history for valuable and necessary trends to first reach and then exceed the resolution of the original needs. T h i s tendency has often required legislative reform
to seek a healthier permanent balance. T h i s has been the case with the development of unionism, the assertion of constitutional rights of criminal defendants,
and numerous other economic and social issues. I suggest that we are at such
a turning point i n the process by which the phenomenon of risk has been used
to enroll the accounting profession i n an expanding public service capacity.
I submit that the accounting profession has reached a stage of maturity i n these
new responsibilities that can be threatened and eroded by the continuation and
escalation of those risks.
Possible Solutions Considered
A recognition that the risks of litigation constitute an undue burden upon
the public as well as the accounting profession requires us to examine some possible solutions. W e should turn first to a popular misconception—that insurance
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provides all the protection the profession requires. T h e S E C and many protagonists of plaintiffs' rights profess that accounting firms can insure themselves
against the risks of liability and pass the cost of such insurance on to their clients.
This belief that the accounting profession is simply a conduit for spreading the
risk to the business community and therefore to the ultimate consumer underlies
the thinking of virtually all of the commentators who promote the concept of
civil damage recoveries against auditors. I consider the proposition to be i l l
founded for a number of reasons:
• T h e continued availability of adequate levels of insurance coverage
for the accounting profession i n this country is subject to considerable
doubt. A s recently as the early 1970's coverage for the profession was
available from numerous insurance companies who competed for our
business i n both price and benefits. Today only a handful of companies
continue to provide coverage for accountants, and only w i t h massive
premium increases, sharp increases i n coverage restrictions, and mandatory deductibles that render us substantially self insured. F o r example, the B i g 8 has experienced a several hundred percent increase
in premiums, for barely more than 50 percent of the total coverage
once available, and a m i n i m u m 5 million dollar annual deductible, all
i n the past three years. A n d we are lucky; smaller firms continue to
struggle w i t h the availability of coverage of any k i n d .
• It is a fiction to believe that an accounting firm can directly pass on
the entire cost of its litigation expense and insurance premiums i n the
form of higher fees. T h e profession i n the U . S . , particularly the national firms, are highly competitive and the profession as a whole is
subject to demands by the business community for economizing i n
professional services. A s a result, it is far more likely that the cost
of litigation w i l l be absorbed i n depressed personal incomes, or more
regrettably from the public's viewpoint, i n less recruiting, training
and self improvement.
• T h e public gets little benefit from the overall cost of litigation. A s
Jaenicke points out, no more than one third of total damage awards
ever finds its way into the public pocket, which is hardly productive
to society as a whole. Other forms of insurance protection such as
auto liability, personal health and accident, etc., are designed to achieve
a preponderance of public recoveries as opposed to handling costs.
I believe the estimate of one third public recoveries i n the securities
field to be unrealistically high (the subject is presently being studied
by the Department of Justice) and even if accurate it hardly seems to
justify the burdens imposed by the process. I am indebted to Henry
H i l l , now retired from Price Waterhouse & Co., for the observations
that present class action litigation is mindful of the ancient practice of
according justice by cutting off the ear of the malefactor and awarding
it to the injured party. W e differ only i n that he does not refer to the
making of ear amputations highly profitable to the lawyers who perform them.
A n Alternative to Insurance
If insurance is a non-solution to the liability problem, where can we look
for more hopeful solutions? T h e Cohen Commission, despite its conclusion
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that some risk is good for the profession and the public, endorses the American
L a w Institute's proposal to limit the amount of potential liability recoverable
under the Federal Securities A c t . That proposal, which is part of the A L I ' s suggested recodification of the Federal Securities Laws, would limit recoveries to
the greater of one percent of the auditing firm's annual revenues, or one m i l l i o n
dollars. T h e limitation would not apply, however, to liabilities resulting from
financial statement misrepresentations i n which the auditor had actual knowledge
of fraud. T h e A L I explains this proposal as a balancing of the benefits and
detriments of litigation risks:
There must me some m a x i m u m . . . to prevent the possibility of utterly
outlandish recoveries from material but nevertheless relatively insubstantial lapses. . . . T h e other side of the coin is that, unless the potential
liability is high enough to attract able lawyers who are w i l l i n g to undertake class actions on a contingency basis there may not be any practical
enforcement. . . . " (Reporter's Comments on Tentative Draft N u m b e r
T w o , 1973)
T h e A L I code has been i n preparation for nearly a decade and has benefited from an extraordinary amount of public and professional attention. A s you
might expect, the proposed liability limit has enjoyed the active support of the
accounting profession. Unfortunately, despite all the effort and expertise behind
it, I doubt that the proposed code w i l l fly through Congress without considerable
political reshaping. If the recent active interest i n the accounting profession by
some Congressmen and staff members has a broad public constituency (which is
an issue for another day) then the liability limitation could be i n for tough
sledding.
Other Considerations
Without regard to the fate of this A L I proposal, three other goals available
to Congress and the courts alike, are worthy of consideration. T h e first deals
with the standard for justifying liability of accountants. Specifically, I suggest
the adoption of statutory or judicial standards akin to the principles of the
Ultramares case: " A n y auditor or auditing can be held liable to its client for
negligence, but should be liable to others (such as the investing public) only
when guilty of criminal participation i n that client's fraud or of a k n o w i n g failure
to exercise its professional responsibilities. "Such a standard, which closely resembles the Supreme Court's definition of scienter i n Hochfelder, would not
absolve auditors from serious professional failings. Rather, it would minimize
the risk of being treated as an indemnitor of market losses i n the guise of hindsight determinations of negligence.
Second, the profession's o w n standards of conduct should be recognized as
adequate defenses to charges of malpractice. Certain commentators and a handful of cases have suggested that judges and juries can ignore compliance w i t h
generally accepted accounting principles and generally accepted auditing standards if, with hindsight, they determine that the financial statements should have
been differently presented. B u t if the profession is to be continually subjected
to fear of liability as a stimulus towards effective performance, the profession
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must have some confidence that effective performance can be measured i n advance of the difficult professional judgments it is required to make. W i t h o u t
the structure of G A A S and G A A P to rely upon, fear is more likely to produce
the irrational results of guessing against the views of a judge or a jury than
useful efforts to comply with established professional rules. Stated differently,
if G A A S and G A A P are to apply only at the time judgments are made by an
auditor and not at the time the judgments are made by a judge or jury, then
there is no way that the accounting profession can convert its fear of liability into
any meaningful form of public protection.
T h i r d , i n order to recover damages from accountants, plaintiffs should be
required to establish a clear line between their losses and the misrepresentations
alleged to have occurred i n financial statements. Courts have been increasingly
w i l l i n g to ignore the traditional need for proof of reliance and causation i n
order to facilitate recoveries by large classes of plaintiffs. T h e fiction used to
cover this erosion of standards is the claim that financial statements can be assumed to have an effect upon the market price of widely traded stocks, and that
proof of individual investment decisions is unnecessary. W h i l e this fiction
greatly aids class action plaintiffs, it also serves to obliterate the effect of any
other causes of plaintiff's loss, such as general market decline, industry-wide
difficulty, or mismanagement of corporate affairs. W h e n these intervening causes
of loss are, i n effect, defined out of existence the accountants (and other defendants i n securities cases) are converted to insurers of all market losses when
there has been financial statement error, even if the error had little effect on the
value of securities.
These three proposals are, of course, more complex than suggested by my
comments, and they require careful scrutiny of possible negative effects. But
each seems to be a limited and manageable objective w i t h i n the present legal
structure, and each offers attractive ways of containing the auditor liability
problem.
A F i n a l Observation
N o n e of the foregoing proposals, including the statutory limitation on
liability, is intended to detract from the accounting profession's own obligation
to contain its exposure through the careful and skillful rendering of services.
But quality controls and professional responsibilities are already highly developed
w i t h i n the profession and the burdens of litigation continue to grow. I submit
that the profession, and the public it serves, deserve a careful analysis and
adoption of those measures which produce a realistic balance of responsibility
and risk.

125

